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Abstract. This paper builds on a generic conceptual model to be used in 
research that uses agent-based models. The aim is to model human social 
interaction at a detailed level, such as would be needed for believable 
interactions of embodied virtual characters. This means we model Homo 
biologicus, not Homo economicus. The present conceptual article 
investigates the modelling of rituals as a basic unit of group interaction. 
The ideas introduced here aim at modelling the unwritten rules of social 
interaction across cultures. The main example is about smoking in bars.  
Keywords: meta-model, human social biology, drives, emotions, culture, 
personality, rituals, moral circle 
1 Introduction 
Suppose that you are walking around on your own in an unknown city. You enter into 
a bar. Your first action will probably be to assess the atmosphere. If everybody looks 
up as you enter, you will sense that you have interrupted something. That ‘something’ 
involved shared attention by all people present. If you find out that there seems to be a 
private celebration going on, or a meeting, you might leave discreetly, so as to avoid 
interfering. What you have sensed is the sacredness of ritual. This is an important 
element of human social life. 
Upon meeting an old friend in that bar, how would you start talking? That would 
depend on who it is; you want to present things relevant to that person and to the 
context. There might be shared knowledge such as shocking news, and social events 
such as meetings and breaks. Most of these would be mundane on an ordinary day. 
But if you have not met for the past year, you would pick highlights: holidays, 
celebrations, funerals, diploma ceremonies. 
These highlights that we consider worth telling about tend to be rituals that change 
our social order. Most of the other things we do, although they do not change things, 
partly serve to confirm the existing order. For instance, describing the news of the day 
both informs our interlocutor and posits us as members of a community. 
So it appears that there is a lot of ritual, small and grand, in our everyday lives. 
Rothenbuhler [[1]] devoted an entire book to defining the communicative aspects of 
ritual in an inclusive way, including quite a few mundane behaviours that are not 
included in the grand rituals mentioned above. His definition (p. 27) is  
 
“Ritual is the voluntary performance of appropriately patterned behavior to 
symbolically effect or participate in the serious life”.  
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We follow his definition in this paper. One crucial element in this definition is 
“appropriately patterned” – so there are unwritten rules, if no written ones, about what 
counts as appropriate. A second one is the aim to symbolically effect the serious life – 
a ritual is a social act. A third important element is that it does not matter whether one 
is alone or not; even people who are alone frequently engage in behaviour satisfying 
the above definition, as e.g. when they wash their hands before or after certain 
actions. Even so, the vast majority of rituals involve several people, and our examples 
are concerned with that situation. 
Rituals could be convenient in modelling social behaviour in situations where its 
emergent nature is important, where one zooms in on particular group interactions 
rather than to model average tendencies. Such a fine granularity is e.g. required to 
model the social interactions of embodied virtual characters [2]. This paper will 
explore conceptually how it could be done.  
The possibility of defining agents with different goals and different emotional 
profiles has facilitated their individualisation. However, humans live in societies, 
which are organized around groups. Collaboration with such groups is essential to 
survive. As such, to model socially intelligent agents, it is also important to 
encompass aspects of the social group(s) the agent is part of, defining how those 
aspects influence the agent’s individual behaviour, namely its beliefs, desires, 
intentions and emotions. The idea here is that for much of our lives, our main 
objective is not to do with organizations or benefits but with enacting our place in the 
social order of which we are a part, as is confirmed by social scientific research [3], 
[1], [4]. We here tread the slippery terrain of grand ideas about human nature, and 
from there to the formalism of a working simulation model is quite a journey, of 
which this paper hopes to draw a tentative conceptual map. This work can then be 
used by others to create or enhance implementations. 
1.1  Related research  
The social world is so complex that modelling its operation is by definition a daunting 
task, and simplification of some kind is imperious. But what to leave out, and why? 
The choice depends on one’s objectives, as well as ones disciplinary background. The 
state of the art is quite varied.  
First, there is a stream of research strongly inspired by economics, as exemplified 
in the Artificial Economics conference series. Here, individual, more or less rational 
Homo economicus is usually the subject. There are increasing forays into social 
science; for instance the 2010 [5] and 2011 [6] conferences in the series  include 
treatment of social learning and of social facilitation. There are also links with game 
theory. The granularity is such that actual interactions between individuals are much 
iconized, and rituals are not dealt with. 
Then, there is an active community with a background in computing science. 
Building systems that can actually run on computers is a major focus here, as is the 
architecture of such systems. The recent Handbook of research on Multi-Agent 
Systems [7] shows that semantics and dynamics of organizational models are active 
topics in this community. Organization is a level of aggregation that promises to 
allow for systems that will run on computers and have a manageable complexity. The 
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complexity of organization, and the links between formal and informal organization, 
and between individual-level and organization-level behaviour, are all explored here. 
In almost all contributions, motivations of individuals are deemed to coincide with 
organizational objectives. An exception is a contribution from cognitive science [8], 
in which the author advocates to build systems in which agents might go against 
organizational rules based on their own powers, goals or relationships. The possibility 
of emerging rules in addition to deontic ones is also present in [9]. Here again, rituals 
are not dealt with; one could say Homo cognitivus is the main actor. 
A third relevant community, overlapping with the others, is that of social 
simulation as joined in the WCSS and ESSA conferences. Here, the emphasis is on 
applying a variety of social scientific theories in agent-based and other computational 
techniques. Subjects include communication, learning, social dynamics and change, 
and other aspects of human social structure and behaviour.  Again, the fine granularity 
of actual interactions is not currently a much-studied topic. Creating agents that are 
able to act in a social context in a similar manner as humans is still a very challenging 
problem, and so far the results are limited. One of the reasons is due to the fact that 
many elements need to be considered in order to achieve a behaviour that is socially 
believable, such as perceiving the actions of others, inferring the intentions behind 
such actions and reacting emotionally to them.  
 
1.2. Relation to the BDI and OCC theories 
 
These challenges have motivated the research on agent architectures that consider 
social interaction. Many of these architectures are based on the general Beliefs-
Desires-Intentions (BDI) paradigm [10] and on appraisal theories of emotion such as 
the OCC theory [11].  
A BDI agent [10] is an agent that is imbued with three particular concepts in its 
reasoning: beliefs, desires, and intentions. Beliefs represent the information the agent 
knows about its environment, including information about itself and other agents. 
Desires represent the goals the agent wants to achieve given the opportunity to do so 
and an intention represents a commitment to achieve a certain desire. 
Following the BDI paradigm, rituals can be seen as desires to which the agent 
forms an intention to achieve when he believes that the preconditions of the ritual are 
true. Given that the actions of the ritual are prescribed, the performance of a ritual is 
done in a predetermined manner. As such, rituals share some similarities with the 
notion of plan recipes used in traditional BDI architectures. An important difference is 
that the actions of a ritual are performed mainly for their symbolic value, whereas the 
actions in a traditional plan are performed for their instrumental value. As such, the 
focus on a ritual is primarily in the symbolical meaning of the actions and not on what 
they physically accomplish.  
As for the OCC theory of emotion [11], because it is comparably easy to 
implement in a computational manner, it is the appraisal theory most commonly used 
in software agents. The theory views emotions as the result of a valenced reaction to 
events in relation to the agent’s goals, standards, and attitudes. It defines a 
hierarchical organization for emotion types which represent a family of related 
emotions differing in terms of their intensity and manifestation. For instance, the 
emotion type Pride refers to the possible set of emotions that result from appraising an 
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important action performed by the agent which is highly praiseworthy according to 
the agent’s standards. 
As rituals are mostly related to the standards of the agent, performing a ritual is a 
likely an antecedent of Pride. On the other hand, breaking a ritual, a blameworthy 
action, elicits Shame, with an intensity that is proportional to the importance the agent 
gives to that ritual. Asides from Pride and Shame, there are other two emotion types 
in the OCC theory that are related to the praiseworthiness of the event: Admiration 
and Reproach. The difference with Pride and Shame lies on the agent’s responsibility 
for the event. When an agent is responsible for an event it elicits Pride or Shame, but 
when it is another agent who is responsible, the agent elicits Admiration or Reproach 
for that agent. 
It follows that rituals can be used with BDI agents that have OCC-based emotions, 
provided symbolic meaning of actions is given value. To do this well, an operational 
concept of a moral circle to which a ritual is meaningful, is desirable. With such an 
operationalization, the simulation can let social emotions that occur during a ritual be 
shared by all its participants. 
Embodied virtual characters are found in games, of which there is an enormous 
proliferation. Research has come up with some games that pay attention to cultural 
believability. One publication explicitly introduces ritual [2]. Ritual is here defined as 
a tuple < T, R, C, S, O >: Type (e.g. greeting), set of Roles, Context of activation, set 
of Steps, set of Ordering constraints.  
This work fits with our current perspective. A strong feature is that shared attention 
is modelled: the ritual knowledge is shared by all participants. This can be the basis 
for an operational concept of moral circle: each agent can have a basic moral circle, as 
well as one that is currently active in a ritual. 
 
To conclude the tour along the literature: there is a case for bottom-up modelling of 
human social behaviour, including rituals. Here we shall extract a formal model of 
ritual processes that can be used in social simulations. It will remain for later 
contributions to actually use these ideas in agent-based simulations. Such simulations 
could be inspired by any of the research traditions mentioned above. 
 
2 Rituals  
 
2.1 Definition 
We now return to rituals. Rothenbühler’s definition given above is “Ritual is the 
voluntary performance of appropriately patterned behaviour to symbolically effect or 
participate in the serious life”. Wikipedia specifies what ‘the serious life’ often 
amounts to: “A ritual is a set of actions, performed mainly for their symbolic value. It 
may be prescribed by a religion or by the traditions of a community. The term usually 
excludes actions which are arbitrarily chosen by the performers.” This leaves us with 
the question how much of our behaviours are actually arbitrary. The odds are out on 
this question, see e.g. [2]. In this article there is no need to decide, since we are 
dealing with a subset of explicit collective behaviours only.  
Hofstede et al 2010, in discussing culture, define rituals in a way that fits our 
objectives, as “collective activities that are technically superfluous to reach desired 
ends but that, within a culture, are considered socially essential”. This definition is 
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close to the Wikipedia one but excludes non-social activities. It is not always easy to 
apply though, for a number of reasons:   
 Different perceptions 
Normally, a ritual involves shared attention. This is important for a simulation, 
since it can be used for economy of memory: all participants have the same 
knowledge about the ritual and its progress. However, in reality it is quite 
possible that one person – probably an insider - would consider an action 
technically necessary while another – probably an observer - merely considers it 
a ritual (see e.g. [12]). This is for instance the case for cleaning practices imposed 
on infants; they vary enormously across cultures, are justified by those who 
engage in them in terms of practical relevance, but might be considered largely 
ritual, or even practically harmful, by cross-cultural observers. When activities 
are linked to the things that a researcher holds sacred, even investigating the 
distinction between the practical and the ritual could be taboo. 
 Mixed activities 
Many activities combine the practical and the ritual. Consider a football match: 
its meaning is obviously a ritual battle. But to some it might be a real battle with 
real stakes, for instance to those who bet on it, or to those who attack 
underperforming players after the match. To the players and watchers, practical 
aspects of ball handling technique are important. To some, the whole realm of 
football is socially essential while to others it is meaningless. 
From these two points we can conclude that as a side effect, rituals actually serve to 
create or maintain groups: those who engage in them, those who believe in them, 
those who ignore them, and so on. This is important. Behind the stated aim of a ritual, 
there is what we could call a meta-aim at group level, pertaining to the life cycle of 
that group. 
 
2.2 Markers of the social order of the moral circle 
There are certainly social behaviours that are more obviously ritualistic than others, 
for instance: marriages, funerals, diploma ceremonies, rites de passage. These are all 
events that change the social order in a group or community. Other rituals that are 
usually less intense serve to reinforce existing order: church services, parties of 
friends, family meals. In every case it is important to determine to whom the ritual is 
meaningful. This is what we shall call the rituals’ moral circle ([3]). 
 
The moral circle is a fluid concept, meaning “all who belong”. In our context an 
operational definition might be “all who are present in an agent’s mind, and who 
influence that agent’s actions”. The most obvious moral circle is an ethnic, religious 
or national community; one could call this the basic moral circle of an agent. 
However, moral circles are nested, until the transient, e.g. a team at work, or even the 
ephemeral, a queue at a counter. Each context shapes its own moral circle. Religious 
communities and peoples keep their rituals and identities across generations. It 
follows that several moral circles can affect the actions of any one person at any time, 
and rituals at one level might be overridden by rituals at another – for instance, in 
most cultures, leaving work duties to marry or to bury a family member would be 
allowable, or even endorsed. The accepted priority between events is itself symbolic 
of a prioritization among moral circles. How much nesting of moral circles to account 
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for, and how to prioritize, is an important design variable of models. Particularly 
when one studies cross-cultural differences, the relative importance that agents attach 
to e.g. national authority and law, religious taboo, organization rules,  and individual 
volition is crucial [13] k. 
 
Rituals can be seen as markers of the social order. That social order defines identity, 
relationships and obligations, or in the words of this article, group membership, 
dominance and affiliation relationships. The degree to which these relationships are 
codified is associated with culture. The stronger the codification, the stronger the 
ritual needs to be that either reinforces or changes it. 
 
Meta-aims of rituals 
This action of a ritual on the social order of the moral circle is its meta-aim. Meta-
aims can be categorized in various ways. 
 
First, one could categorize rituals according to which basic drives are at stake: Sex, 
Affiliation, Novelty, Dominance? Rituals tend to affect more than one of these at the 
same time. They frequently also include Maslow’s [14] basic needs for nutrition or 
safety. In a model that takes into account agents’ drive satisfaction level, this is an 
important distinction. 
 
Second, one could look at the profoundness of change brought about by the ritual, on 
a scale from tremendous change (state formation, merging of religions, declaration of 
war) via routinely occurring change (marriages, funerals, rites de passage) to 
confirmations of the status quo (religious services, sports tournaments – although 
these latter do change dominance hierarchies). 
 
A third categorization, and one useful for modelling, is one that distinguishes the level 
of action of a ritual within its moral circle. 
 Group level: the entire moral circle is affected. The ritual could be about 
increasing coherence, about mobilization against a threat, about confirming the 
group’s status (e.g. a national celebration). 
 Relationship level: a relationship between a number of participants of the moral 
circle  - frequently two – is begun, reaffirmed, or ended (e.g. a marriage; 
government change). 
 Individual level: an individual changes its group affiliation, e.g. enter group; 
change status; leave group.  Taking up or quitting smoking could be a case in 
point. 
A problem with this categorization is that it could be ambiguous. The same ritual can 
have effects at two or more levels if the nested nature of moral circles is taken into 
account. 
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2.3. Rituals as a process 
Based on the above we shall now investigate how rituals could be used as elements in 
models of Homo biologicus. We shall use examples of smoking in bars. 
 
We distinguish the following phases: preconditions, start of the ritual, course of the 
ritual (with probably repeated actions), conclusion. 
 
 
Preconditions 
If a ritual is a marker of the social order we can expect it to happen under specified 
conditions. These could pertain to contextual factors and to factors in the minds of the 
potential participants.  
 
Context 
A ritual requires context factors for it to begin: people are required to fill certain roles, 
and those people should have certain qualities and be in proper state; and time / place 
/ environment conditions need to be met. For instance, a party without drinks and with 
only two people cannot take off. 
 
In the mind: Rules of the social game 
Norms, both institutionalized ‘deontic’ ones and emergent ‘social’ ones, specify 
which social or socio-contextual states are acceptable and what could be done to cope 
with non-acceptable states. They can be consulted by agents (and this could be an 
unconscious process as far as their minds are concerned) to see whether a ritual 
should be started. 
 
A simulation could search for these conditions and decide that a ritual might start. For 
instance, if the simulation encounters two agents in search of  a person to talk to, 
willing to smoke, and satisfying the particular constraints of the society to which they 
belong for addressing one another, then they might start a ritual of proposing and 
accepting cigarettes as an ice-breaker. If this all happens in a place where smoking is 
forbidden, and where more agents are around that are willing to enforce that rule, then 
those others might start a norm-enforcing ritual. 
 
How does a ritual begin? 
A strongly codified ritual might have a codified scheduling, e.g. each morning, each 
Friday, each Sunday. Other rituals might start in more haphazard ways, e.g. upon a 
chance meeting. Our example of smoking in bars is mainly concerned with the latter 
category. 
 
Initiating move 
A ritual begins when one person makes an initiating move. This could be no more 
than a brief glance at someone – a signal that could be ignored without attracting 
general attention - , or it could be a signal action such as banging a hammer on a 
table, or sounding a bell – signals much harder to ignore. In our example it could be 
producing a packet of cigarettes. 
8 
 
 
Response 
The initiating move then leads to a response. Responses can be classified according to 
two dimensions: direction (going along with the initiating move or opposing it); and 
strength of the response. See table 2. 
 
Table 2: possible responses to ritual-initiating moves 
 
direction strength 
low   high 
positive acquiesce accept support reinforce 
neutral ignore discreetly annotate modify  
negative ignore ostensibly constrain oppose oppose fiercely 
 
When modelling a ritual, depending on the level of granularity and on the 
representation, one could use only part of these responses, or even abstract to the 
direction only. There might be a problem with the current table 2 in that the same 
response may mean different things across cultures; e.g. ‘acquiesce’ might be an 
improper way to show intensity of response in indulgent, individualistic cultures, but 
a perfectly normal way in restrained, collectivistic ones. So the table might need to be 
calibrated for culture. 
 
A crucial element of these responses is their moral charge related to the moral circle. 
This charge has to do with feedback about the moral quality of the proposal. Such 
feedback depends strongly on culture. In an individualistic culture, explicit feedback, 
modified by the personal relation that the proposer and the responder have, could be 
expected. In a collectivistic culture, group-level emotions such as pride and shame 
would be more likely to be invoked, and this might be done implicitly. 
 
Reaction to response: fate of the ritual 
The response will then trigger more action from the initiator, or from others who are 
present. The result could be  
 Following up on a positive response, the ritual goes on as intended by the 
initiator 
 Following up on a modification response, the ritual takes on a different form or 
context (e.g. moving to a different place to smoke there) 
 Following up on opposition, part of the group leaves the ritual, or the initiator 
leaves the group, or the ritual’s intensity diminishes, or the ritual is aborted. 
 
Course of the ritual: emergent properties 
Once a ritual has taken off it can run for some time. A model might not necessarily 
wish to capture every single interaction at this stage but it could focus on the 
emergent properties of the ritual-in-action. The initial responses’ directions and 
strengths, as a result of the states and drives of participants and of context factors, can 
lead to different ways of enacting the ritual. Just how this happens is quite hard to 
determine; it involves contagion of emotion and arousal. One could model the level 
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and direction of contagion depending on relative status, emotional states and perhaps 
other person-level variables. Anyway, participants to a ritual keenly feel ritual-level 
qualities once they have emerged. This could be expressed as ritual homogeneity (are 
participants equally involved; from disjoint to concerted) and intensity (the level of 
commitment to the ritual; from noncommittal to intense). In a simulation, these ritual-
level variables could be useful for determining when the ritual ends. For instance 
 Low-intensity responses can lead to noncommittal ritual enactment, as opposed 
to intense ones.  
 Concerted responses lead to coherent ritual enactment, with at its opposite end 
chaotic ritual enactment, or perhaps splitting up. 
Such variables could be useful in simulations about crowd behaviours. 
 
Deontic versus instance attributes of rituals 
Each instance of a ritual has its variables, but the ritual also has a deontic level of 
sacredness. This is determined by its social purpose and by the moral circle for which 
it serves that purpose. The sacredness of a ritual can be bolstered by its actual 
enactment but is partially pre-defined in norms. How to represent this in a model? The 
ritual’s purpose, discussed above, could be a clue, as would the moral circle to which 
it applies and the entity that sets the rules. Rituals for which religious or state 
authorities set the rules tend to be particularly sacred. In our smoking example, the 
relationship between citizens and their government will be crucial. This relationship is 
culturally mediated. As an example, consider the three cigarette packs in figure 3. The 
leftmost one (front and back shown) was sold at Madrid airport on 2007, and it flings 
the EU smoking ban at the buyer, couched in terms that invoke personal 
independence. Similar messages can now be found on most cigarette packages across 
the EU. The middle one was sold in China in 2009, where officials were forced to 
smoke their quota of local cigarettes or face public disgrace; smoking fills the 
province’s treasury which is a patriotic thing to do. It pictures Tiananmen, says 
‘China’ and gives the Shanghai manufacturer’s name. The rightmost was sold in 
Slovenia in 2003. In nonintrusive print, it provides a personalized message stating 
“The minister says smoking is bad for you”. This symbolizes a fatherly (personal and 
authoritarian) relationship between the minister and the would-be smoker that is 
absent from the EU rhetoric. 
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Figure 3: messages on cigarette packs, from left to right: EU, China, Slovenia. 
 
Relative status of the initiator and the other group members, in combination with 
cultural factors, will strongly impact the ritual’s fate.  One could also take contextual 
factors into account; for instance there could be practical impediments to carrying out 
the ritual. 
 
During all of these steps each of the ritual’s participants will have to engage in mental 
activity. We could model this as follows 
 Continuously perceiving the ritual’s intensity and perhaps other ritual-level 
variables 
 Perhaps making a correcting or a ritual-ending move, based on this assessment 
and one’s own state, or modifying one’s level of commitment 
 Influencing one another through social contagion, leading to a new ritual-level 
state in terms of homogeneity and intensity.  
 
When somebody else makes a move, the following might happen: 
1 Perceiving a move or response from one or several others 
2 Interpreting  it, based on theory of mind about those who make the move 
3 Assessing what this means for one’s own arousal, and for one’s drive satisfaction 
in terms of affiliation, novelty and dominance (and here, cultural filters will be 
particularly strong; e.g. “is it ‘taking initiative’ or ‘fitting in’ that is socially 
endorsed for somebody in my position?” 
4 Selecting a response.  
 
End of the ritual 
At each turn, every participant can thus influence the ritual’s continuation. Whether 
the ritual comes to an end will depend on 
 Punctuation of the ritual. There may be points at which ending is prohibited by 
the ritual’s rules, e.g. during the smoking of a cigarette, and points at which it is 
allowed, e.g. upon finishing one. 
 Each agent’s state; they might have the aim to stay close to others in the ritual, or 
to get away. 
In what way the ritual ends will depend on its parameters. A low-sanctity, 
heterogeneous, low-intensity ritual might just dissolve without any formal closure. A 
high-sanctity and / or high-intensity ritual will require a formal act of closure that will 
itself be highly ritualistic. The nature of the ending of a ritual is quite culture-
dependent. 
The ritual’s level of sanctity and intensity, and each participant’s drive satisfaction, at 
the ritual’s conclusion may be taken into account as a parameter that the participants 
memorize and use to decide whether to engage in new instances. 
 
3  Concluding remarks 
Rituals are so varied in form and so omnipresent in human lives that their use in agent 
models is in all likelihood a great advantage. Finding the middle ground between the 
generic attributes of rituals and the richness required to model a certain phenomenon 
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is challenging. The conceptual model presented here is particularly suited to 
modelling the unwritten rules of social interaction across cultures. It will still have to 
show its value in practice. 
One important phenomenon that has not been taken into account is the potential 
co-occurrence of rituals. A model that deals with it will have to work with interrupts, 
perhaps based on the urgency (as different from sacredness) of a ritual.  
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